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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1286

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LIST OF BOOKS ON COMMANDERS AND MILITARY LEADERS

Moscow KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, 20 May 77 p 12

[List of books: "Soviet Commanders and Military Leaders"]

[Text] ...People will never forget those who led our troops from victory to victory in the civil war and the Great Patriotic War, who gained fame for our homeland with their deeds. I always read with great pleasure books on military leaders and Heroes of the Soviet Union. But the most interesting of all are series editions which tell about many heroes. I therefore request that you publish in KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE bibliographies of series on these people.

R. Seliverstov, student at Moscow State University
im. M. V. Lomonosov

Soviet Commanders and Military Leaders

The series entitled "Soviet Commanders and Military Leaders" has been coming out since 1964, published by Voenizdat. These small books discuss military leaders whose lives and military careers constitute a vivid example of service to the homeland.

Following is a list of the books appearing in this series.

1964

Nazarov, A.: "Nikolay Markin."

Obertas, I.: "Nachdiv dvadtsatoy Velikanov" [Commander of the the 20th Division Velikanov].

Tarasov, Ye.: "Nikolay Il'ich Podvoyskiy."

1965

Ayrapetyan, G.: "Legendarnyy Gay" [The Legendary Gay].

Kondrat'yev, N.: "Marshal Blyukher" [Marshal Blyukher].

Pankov, D.: "Komkor Eydeman" [Commander Eydeman].

1966

Kuznetsov, P.: "Marshal Tolbukhin."

Mus'yakov, P.: "Flagman Konstantin Dushenov" [Flag Officer Konstantin Dushenov].

Plyushchev, V.: "Nikolay Tomin."

Timofeyev, Ye.: "Stepan Vostretsov."

1967

Vinogradov, A., and Ignatova, A.: "Geroy-komandarm" [Army Commander-Hero].

1968

Kondrat'yev, N.: "Nachdiv Vladimir Azin" [Division Commander Vladimir Azin].

1969

Vakurov, I., and Andreyev, G.: "General Kirponos."

Kuznetsov, P.: "General Chernyakhovskiy."

Ol'derogge, G.: "Modest Ivanov."

Sboychakov, M., et al: "Mikhail Sergeyevich Kedrov."

1970

Bychevskiy, B.: "Marshal Govorov."

1971

Vargin, N.: "Komkor Ivan Gryaznov" [Commander Ivan Grayznov].

1973

Obertas, I.: "Komandarm Fedko" [Army Commander Fedko].

1974

Yegorov, P.: "Marshal Meretskov."

1975

Tarasov, Ye.: "Kraskom Genrikh Eykhe" [Red Commander Genrikh Eykhe].

1977

Buzukashvili, M.: "Nachdiv Kikvidze" [Division Commander Kikvidze].

In 1968 the Moskovskiy Rabochiy Publishing House began putting out a series entitled "Bogatyri" [Heroes], dedicated to Muscovite Heroes of the Soviet Union. The authors of these books -- writers, journalists, war veterans -- relate the story of Soviet citizens awarded the Hero Gold Star for combat gallantry and bravery.

1968

Kravtsova, N.: "Na goryashchem samolete" [On a Burning Airplane]. Hero of the Soviet Union N. Kravtsova tells of her fighting comrade, navigator, Hero of the Soviet Union Rufina Gasheva.

1969

Lapin, N.: "Kogda govoryat pushki" [When the Cannons Speak]. About gifted artist and fearless artilleryman Mikhail Gurëvich, who died the death of the brave in 1943.

Salutskiy, A.: "Uletaya -- vozvrashchaysya" [Fly Back Home]. About the life and heroic death of N. A. Ostryakov, an outstanding commander and man.

Tsessarskiy, A.: "Zhizn' Dmitriya Medvedeva" [The Life of Dmitriy Medvedev]. About the life of Soviet Cheka officer D. N. Medvedev, dedicated to the fight against counterrevolution.

1971

Markova, G.: "Yunost' v ogne" [Youth in Fire]. Describes the glorious youth of pilot Klavdiya Fomicheva.

Pavlov, V.: "Zakon muzhestva" [Law of Courage]. On the life and fighting deeds of partisan scout Fedor Kravchenko.

Tsyganov, I.: "Vperedi pekhoty" [Ahead of the Infantry]. Tells of artillery spotter Kravtsov.

1973

Gitkovich, V.: "Na ostriye tankovogo klina" [At the Point of a Tank Spearhead]. War biography of tanker Leonid Bykov.

L'vov, M.: "Boyevoy! Tak derzhat'!" [Maintain Combat Formation!]. On the heroic deeds of squadron commander Andrey Yefremov and his men.

1974

Baksheyeva, G.: "Tanki idut na miny" [Tanks Entering Minefield].

Denisov, V.: "Zenitki b'yut po vedushchemu" [Antiaircraft Guns Fire at the Lead Aircraft]. Story based on the deeds of famed attack pilot A. A. Yegorova (Timofeyeva).

Markova, G.: "Ofitser razvedki" [Intelligence Officer]. About daring intelligence officer Aleksandr Kazayev.

Rybin, V. "Zvezdnyy chas mayora Kuznetsova" [Major Kuznetsov's Hour of Glory]. About the feat of D. I. Kuznetsov, commander of a regiment which blocked the advance of fascist tanks.

1976

Denisov, V.: "Podvig ofitsera militsii" [Police Officer's Feat]. On the Life of police captain Hero of the Soviet Union A. Popryadukhin and his famous deeds.

Litvinova, L.: "Ulitsa Tat'yany Makarovoy" [Tatiana Makarova Street]. Hero of the Soviet Union L. Litvinova tells the story of her fighting friend T. Makarova, whose name is borne by a street in Moscow.

Mironov, G. "Chlen Voennoy Soveta" [Member of the Military Council]. On the life and career of Hero of the Soviet Union Semen Mel'nikov, member of the Military Council of the 3d Guards Tank Army.

The following is scheduled for publication in 1977:

Trofimova, S.: "Sud'ba tankista" [Fate of a Tanker]. Fighting episodes from the combat experience of Hero of the Soviet Union A. Ignat'yev, as well as his postwar diplomatic career.

3024

CSO: 1801

DOSAAF TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN THE UZBEK SSR

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 13 May 77 p 3

[Article by Col Gen A. Odintsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF: "For Labor and Defense"]

[Text] The beginning of this year was of great emotional significance to the 80-million-man army of DOSAAF members in this country. On 23 January Soviet citizens celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of DOSAAF. The homeland highly appreciates the services of this organization. For a major contribution toward the development of mass defense activities and preparation of toilers for defense of the socialist homeland, USSR DOSAAF was awarded the highest honor -- the Order of Lenin.

The Eighth All-Union DOSAAF Congress summed up the results of patriotic activities by the numerous DOSAAF units over the last five years, in conformity with the demands of the 25th CPSU Congress and conclusions from the speeches of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, outlined ways to achieve further improvement in mass defense, military-patriotic, training and sports activities.

DOSAAF of the Uzbek SSR is also making a worthy contribution toward preparing toilers for labor and defense. For several years now Uzbekistan has placed high in the socialist competition among this country's DOSAAF organizations. In 1976 this republic once again placed high, finishing in third place.

At the present time the membership of Uzbekistan DOSAAF totals approximately 4 million, contained in 16,377 primary organizations. Under the supervision of party and Soviet agencies and in close contact with trade unions, Komsomol and other public organizations, the aggressiveness and organizer role of oblast, city and rayon DOSAAF committees have increased, while many primary organizations of enterprises, constructions jobs, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, schools and offices have become mass defense activities centers.

A positive influence on improving the quality of the activities of DOSAAF organizations is exerted by their contacts with the men of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District, with military commissariats, civil defense headquarters, and constant improvement of facilities.

All this is greatly assisting in improving the effectiveness of military-patriotic indoctrination of toilers and the younger generation, in improving mass-defense work, in training technical specialists for the USSR Armed Forces and the nation's economy, and more extensively involving young people in the applied military and technical sports.

Experience indicates that the best results are achieved by those DOSAAF oblast, city and rayon committees which devote constant attention to organizational strengthening of primary DOSAAF groups, which concern themselves with furnishing them training and athletic equipment, which synthesize and disseminate advanced know-how, and which concretely teach activists skillful utilization of various forms and methods of organization of socialist competition both among groups and individual DOSAAF members.

The situation is precisely the same as regards unified technical, automotive, marine, and radio schools as well as technical sports clubs. Wherever modern facilities have been established, where there are skilled instructors, shop instructors and athletic coaches, young people acquire profound knowledge, firm skills, and prepare for military service and highly-productive labor.

Worthy of praise, for example, is the job done by the Ferganskaya Oblast DOSAAF Committee and the Yangiyul' City DOSAAF Committee. They strengthen in a planned and organized manner primary DOSAAF groups as well as facilities, including sports facilities. Staff personnel of DOSAAF committees, training organizations, and the numerous activists are always seeking new forms and methods of training, indoctrination and physical conditioning of young people, and skillfully organize work with DOSAAF members of various ages and occupations. It is not surprising that for a number of years now these two organizations have occupied the top positions in all indices of mass defense, training and sports activities.

The Communist Party teaches us not to rest on our laurels, self-critically to assess the results of what has been accomplished and to concentrate our attention and efforts on as-yet unresolved problems, skillfully revealing deficiencies and specifying concrete ways to correct them. Today the main criterion of all military-patriotic, training and sports activities in the 10th Five-Year Plan is quality and effectiveness. It is essential to train and indoctrinate preinduction youth in such a manner that they can successfully carry out their honorable obligation as defender of the homeland from their very first day in the armed forces.

In recent years certain steps have been taken in Uzbekistan to achieve a further upswing and improvement in mass defense activities. However, a concrete and detailed analysis of the performance of a number of rayon, city and oblast DOSAAF committees indicates that there are also serious deficiencies.

A comprehensive examination conducted by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee commission indicated that there still remains much to be desired in this republic as regards the level of direction of primary organizations. In some rayons in Uzbekistan the organization of primary DOSAAF units has not yet been completed, while some DOSAAF rayon committees are failing to perform a specific, purposeful effort to increase their activeness and aggressiveness. In Bekabadskiy and Kalininskiy rayons of Tashkentskaya Oblast, for example, at the present time less than half of the population are members of DOSAAF, while activities are barely crawling along in many primary organizations, with no military-technical study groups and sections formed. Serious violations of the USSR DOSAAF Rules have been committed in Kalininskiy and Srednechirchikskiy rayons in the course of the report-election campaign. The presidium of the Tashkentskaya Oblast DOSAAF Committee must draw serious conclusions from these facts.

There are also many deficiencies in the activities of a number of automotive schools and technical sports groups. Particularly poor results in training and indoctrinating students have been achieved in the Termez and Bekabad auto schools.

What is the reason for this? The fact that these training organizations have not yet set up facilities which meet today's demands. The majority of classroom, shop and driving instructors do not possess sufficient qualifications and methods skills to conduct theory and practical classes at a high level. And yet the oblast committees and republic DOSAAF Central Committee limit themselves to ascertainment of deficiencies and superficial study of the state of affairs at these auto schools, without displaying demandingness toward the directors of lagging training organizations.

This is only one side of it. On the other hand, in Uzbekistan there is clearly insufficient synthesis and dissemination of the experience and know-how of the top DOSAAF training organizations and committees, and yet this experience and know-how are there for the taking.

In recent years the applied military and technical sports have been developing somewhat better in Uzbekistan. But unfortunately far from all technical sports clubs have become strong bases for assisting primary organizations in mass involvement of young people in the sport of the courageous and bold. For example, it was noted at a meeting of DOSAAF activists in Surkhandar'inskaya Oblast that the technical sports clubs in the oblast do not conform to their designation. Forgetting that they are first and foremost sports clubs, they have become involved exclusively

in the paid training of technical specialists. The DOSAAF oblast committee has accepted this practice, and many boys and girls in this oblast are deprived of the opportunity to take active part in small arms marksmanship, automotive and motorcycle sports, go-cart racing, applied military multiple competition, and radio sports. After this is it surprising that for many years now the DOSAAF teams from Surkhandar'inskaya Oblast end up at the bottom of the list in almost all republic competitions?

An investigation revealed that there are also attempts made to embellish the actual state of affairs. For example, in passing Prepared for Labor and Defense performance standards, some DOSAAF training organizations and training centers were so lenient that in a repeat test practically one-third of the trainees failed to confirm their "physical conditioning." Need we state what harm is caused to the entire youth indoctrination effort by such a lack of conscientiousness on the part of some DOSAAF organization leaders? We must declare war, vigorously and implacably, against all instances of fudging and deception, and we must severely punish those who attempt to pose as a performance leader with the aid of juggling of figures and phony reports.

There have also been serious omissions in organization of socialist competition among various DOSAAF subunits in this republic. In many places there is failure to observe the basic principles of organization of competition -- publicity, comparability of results, and adoption of the know-how of others. There have also been revealed instances where in some primary organizations socialist pledges were not discussed at DOSAAF meetings but were mechanically "passed down" from the higher-level DOSAAF committee. In some training organizations group pledges would be made without considering the individual pledges of the persons involved. And this in turn led to a situation where classroom and shop instructors, in order to receive high marks, would deliberately overstate the knowledge and skills of their students.

It has already been noted in the press, and particularly in PRAVDA, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and a number of others that pledging 100 percent passing figures is a gross violation. This exerted pressure on instructors, forcing them to "boost" percentages.

The USSR Ministry of Education has resolutely protested the practice of evaluating the performance of schools and teachers on the basis of average percentage of pupils making passing grades. I believe that it is also high time for DOSAAF training organizations to abandon discredited criteria and vigorously to eradicate formalism in the direction of competition activities.

Uzbekistan DOSAAF possesses every capability to achieve even greater success in boosting all DOSAAF performance and to honor the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in proper fashion.

3024

CSO: 1801

QUALIFICATIONS OF SNIPER-CLASS FIGHTER PILOT DESCRIBED

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jun 77 p 6

[Article by Artem Anfinogenov: "In the Sky -- Expert Marksman"]

[Text] It had been many years since I had been with pilots, around war-planes, and at a command post, but having received my pass, I did not hurry out to the flight line; I strolled through the garrison park, unaccountably delaying that meeting which I had long been awaiting. I recalled old friends.

Before the war a flying instructor appeared each fall at School Number 21 in Perm'. He carried a plotting board on a long strap, and he had a helmet with goggles in the special "bonnet" style of Valeriy Chkalov. And each fall the local flying club received from our school a contingent of new members, as a rule a group with leader. The 1940 group was headed by Yura Sokol'skiy, a gymnast and excellent skier. "May you become an air brigade commander by the age of 25," wrote on the occasion of the new year the girl who shared a classroom desk with Yura.

The commissions were dispersing the student pilots among the various service schools. War was being fought on various fronts.

Yuriy Sokol'skiy became a fighter pilot. Yuriy Salamatov became a bomber pilot, and Nikolay Zhuk a navigator. Air reconnaissance pilot Petr Kulagin, whose path once crossed with mine during the war at a field in the Donbass close to the front, had kept contact with Kudryavtsev, who was defending the skies over Leningrad....

The picture is not quite complete.

I was strolling along the paths in the park, gazing at the portrait of the heroes of this guards Red Banner air regiment. The names I sought were not among them, but each face reminded me of somebody and seemed to jog my memory with something important and dear to my heart, without which one's picture of that far-off time, that familiar environment is incomplete....

Now I was ready, it seemed, to meet today's guard. At the airfield there was a businesslike din. One of the guards squadrons was conducting an exercise.

The shape and bristling equipment of the fighter-bomber were strange to the eyes of a former Il-2 pilot. Taut electric cables and hoses held it like a ship to a mooring. An aircraft must stand on the flight line according to rigidly specified marks, in a definite orientation relative to the earth's axis.... A child of the age!

The pilot, who had been briefed on his weather reconnaissance mission, approached the aircraft with empty hands. He climbed into the glass-canopied, excellent-visibility cockpit, checked his instrument panels and systems....

"No chart? No plotter?" I suddenly blurted.

"Here is my chart," replied Guards Lt Col Vladimir Semenovich Gerasimenko, spreading out a polyethylene packet. The contrasting colors of the air navigation chart peered through the soft protective film. The plotting board had also changed completely, assuming the form of a portable device strapped to the knee. "This is more convenient." The age of supersonic speeds had brought to the forefront radio navigation devices and modern aircraft equipped with self-contained navigation systems. But the pilot's arsenal includes the air navigation chart, just as the art of visual orientation.

The weather reconnaissance mission would be followed by a flight to the bombing range, to attack an "enemy airfield." Preparations for the mission were completed, and every thought was on the attack. The pilot's mouth was drawn tight, and his face showed resolve -- he thought through the forthcoming maneuver again and again. The personal element in aviation will never be eliminated.

Gerasimenko grew up in a community on the Volga, through which passed a route taken during the war by air regiments heading for the front. The village welcomed them and sped them on their way, was current on all new developments, military decorations and casualties, and was familiar with the legends and songs in which aviation abounds....

As we know, children live in the spirit of the time. After the war the school which Vladimir attended proceeded to dispatch groups of students to the flying club. Viktor Mrykin was with him in one of these groups. "A b o r n f i g h t e r p i l o t," Gerasimenko recalled about him. They left the flying club together, enrolled in and graduated from school together. Then their ways parted.

Vladimir Semenovich breaks down his military career not by the airfields where he has served, not by the aircraft which he has flown, but by his

commanding officers. In first place is squadron commander Aleksey Maksimovich Sokolov. Gerasimenko, having made his choice during a youth experienced during a time of national calamity, was pleased. But military pilot Aleksey Sokolov was of the view that choice alone does not make a man. Dedication to one's choice molds one's destiny and brings one happiness. Having bestowed all his knowledge and ability, it would seem, to the newcomer, his commanding officer once said to him: "Lieutenant Gerasimenko, I am recommending you for party membership"....

Years passed. The lieutenant became a lieutenant colonel.

"The main thing is to be ready," Vladimir Semenovitch confided in me. "To think fast, but not to make hasty decisions...."

Such as that night one autumn when his aircraft collided with a bird. The aircraft shook suddenly, and its nose leaped skyward. He grabbed the controls and informed the command post by radio: "The aircraft is shaking violently, engine operating normal." In the speaker at the command post (and in the recording I heard later) the pilot's voice was vibrating and gurgling as if somebody had seized the powerful Gerasimenko (soccer center, first category athlete) by the chest and was shaking him furiously.

Automation takes over in an emergency situation. A relay tripped, and a soft female voice informed him that such and such a system had failed. There was no warning signal, however. "Airspeed dropping, I'm going to land," reported the shaken Gerasimenko. The radio fell silent. The command post had no recommendations to offer. The pilot had to make his own decision, out there in the impenetrable darkness, suddenly and totally alone with the unknown. And he made his decision. Presence of mind and experience won out over this unforeseen incident; an excellent landing confirmed the correctness of the decision. A watch which Vladimir Semenovitch shows with pride bears the inscription: "To Guards Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimenko from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force."

Following the weather reconnaissance mission, he is now out to hit a point target on the gunnery range. As a rule they do not assign him clearly visible area targets but hidden, camouflaged, particularly important targets. This has been his duty since Gerasimenko was made a military pilot first class, with skills and abilities constituting the measure of expertise. To seek out the target, to mark it, to guide in one's wingman, and to destroy it. Or to intercept an "aggressor" in the sky. Electronics, infallible and impassive, produce the calculated figures for aiming. But in the final analysis everything is decided by a deft movement of the human hand, by the precision of the human eye -- the mind, will and heart of the air warrior bring together the work of all services.

This ability is developed year by year and is maintained through work. All things change--combat vehicles, libraries, a wife's place of employment--and children grow up. Within the heart of the armed forces daily routine, that process

called combat improvement is steadily in progress. It is not entirely visible to the outsider. It contains its secrecy, as in any serious human endeavor, and it contains the meaning of life for the military pilot.

In those 20 years which have passed since completing school, Gerasimenko's comrades have scattered to the four winds. Many have not seen one another for years, and correspondence has stopped. But now begins the natural process of experts developing within the company of military pilots first class. This is a special class of pilot. In order to stress the qualitative distinction of these air warriors, they are assigned the title "sharpshooter pilot." One of the first to receive this title, alongside fighter-bomber pilot Gerasimenko, was Lt Col Viktor Mrykin, that same fellow student from the Volga.

Gerasimenko received clearance to take off. Freed from the earthly bonds of the flight line, Gerasimenko's supersonic aircraft, picking up its wings and becoming transformed, shot skyward, a lethal arrowhead....

Inspecting personnel were permitted to view from the air the results of the strike. I climbed aboard.

The helicopter headed toward the bombing range; at our low altitude we could see everything in detail. The air warriors had done their job well. The mock-up aircraft and antiaircraft guns were smashed and twisted.

"Well!" Mar Am Ivan Ivanovich Pstygo, beaming with pleasure, pointed to the wreckage. "Bull's-eye!"

Before the war schoolboy Pstygo began as a student pilot, it was either in Perm' or Ufa, in a flying club on a Po-2; on 22 June he was serving as a lieutenant near the border; he saw action at Khar'kov and Stalin-grad.... He was a regimental commander by the age of 25. Since then he has gone all the way up to marshal aviation. A career which has covered the experiences of several generations.

"A real sharpshooter," stated the marshal, looking over the bombing range. "A real sharpshooter! Take it from an old soldier."

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CSO: 1801

TRAINING ACTIVITIES ON DIESEL SUBMARINE

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 77 signed to press 20 Apr 77 pp 26-27

[Article by Capt 2d Rank V. Nikolayev: "Everyday Life at Sea"]

[Text] Warrant Officer [michman] Kuz'min exited the narrow opening of the conning tower and adroitly, almost without touching the handrails, jumped to the stern superstructure. Only here did he stop and look around. Everything radiated warmth and a fairy tale peace. It seemed as if things were always like this. It was as if there were not those long arduous weeks of the ocean cruise behind them, weeks when the spaces bubbled with intense combat training and work. Everything was distributed equally among the crew. To the machinists, I dare say, more than anyone else. That, at any rate, is what Kuz'min thinks and no one will convince him otherwise. In truth, it should be noted that no one argues with the machinist's mate. The entire crew knows full well that his charges try their utmost to do everything required to consolidate their authority as conscientious and reliable submariners.

They charged the boat's storage batteries while en route to the anchorage. That concern was now behind them, the electricians were satisfied, but the machinists still had plenty to do, even though the diesels were quiet. True, Kuz'min himself found the lion's share of this work. But, he had a nervous nature and a time-honored rule: do not wait for instructions from above but "do your own thing" -- do then and there that which needs to be done. This is his approach to the concept of preventive maintenance to insure accident-free equipment operation.

But now that the boat is rooted to the broad expanse of ocean, anchor dropped, now that time has been allotted to the commanders of departments and compartments so that the crew can better prepare for the ship's holiday, Kuz'min decided to take advantage of this propitious time to change the gas valve rubber. The hermetic seal of gas lines is one of the primary concerns of the machinist's mate and Kuz'min showed such concern constantly and with special effort. Receiving permission to do the work and issuing the required instructions, he now went topside to make an external inspection.

"What beautiful weather!" he thought as he hit the fresh air and began his inspection. "We have to get things in shape quickly so that we can have a holiday of which we can be proud."

Thinking such thoughts, Kuz'min was clearly being modest. He had other things to be proud of besides just this work. The hands confidently maintained their title of excellent and all machinists achieved their first and second class rating. This is the result of his work as machinist's mate, as well as the work of section heads Chief Petty Officers Pavel Yezhov and Anvar Shakhmayev and Petty Officer 1st Class Tarmo Suuster, recognized as knowledgeable and skilled personnel. Also included with the petty officers are other sailors, with less time in service but who have already acquired good naval technique: Boris Chaynikov and Seken Zhenuspekov, Vasiliy Denoy and Anatoliy Zaika. By the way, the entire team of machinists has acquired the glory of being masters of accident-free cruises and is a collective of excellent, leading personnel in all senses of the word.

"Comrade Warrant Officer," Kuz'min heard the voice of Chief Petty Officer Shakhmayev behind him, "Everything is on schedule in the compartment. Permit us to begin work in the enclosure."

"Correct!", the warrant officer said to himself about Shakhmayev's proposal. "Working in the enclosure is uncomfortable. Beginning early means accumulating a time cushion."

Seaman Denoy with his tools stood next to Shakhmayev.

"Go to it!" Kuz'min said tersely. Giving the still ocean a final glance, he headed for the compartment. Roguish sparks flashed in his eyes. Evidently he recalled the instance which caused Seaman Denoy to address his section commander with special respect. Shakhmayev once tasked him with changing piston rings. A drill on this subject was conducted beforehand among the crew and the chief petty officer, satisfied with the seaman's answer that the task was clear in his mind, turned him loose. Denoy went to work but soon realized that everything was far from clear. It looked like a simple job but the rings would not come off. He put a screwdriver under the rings but they broke rather than slipping off. Thus, Chief Petty Officer Shakhmayev found the bewildered seaman. "You show in practice what you failed to learn during training," the section commander thought and he went to work. Dexteriously placing a rag under the ring and stretching it, the chief petty officer easily removed the ring from the piston. Off came the second, the third. Not even 3 minutes had passed by the time he had cleaned off the piston and put on new rings. Shakhmayev turned to the seaman: "Conclusions?!"

Denoy made the proper conclusions: he became more attentive and better prepared for his specialty training drills and, during practical drills, never missed the opportunity to work next to Shakhmayev and draw upon his know-how. He asked the commander to personally check the operations which

he had assimilated well. Here, as well, was manifested the desire to imitate the section commander who, like other petty officers when the work involved the equipment, tried to avoid calling upon the warrant officer, convincing him that they could certainly cope well with the task.

"You will turn me into a shirker," Kuz'min joked.

"Never happen," the petty officers retorted in the same vein. "New personnel will be coming in and, just like with us, you will be getting corns for the next 3 years."

Corns... A warrant officer gets many of them during his years of service. Especially at the outset when, completing petty officer-technician school, he arrived to serve aboard a submarine. Then, off on a long ocean cruise. OK, you put up with the fact that the ocean with its fall storms wears out the boat. Concerns over the equipment during the stress of the storms were annoying. But, even though Kuz'min knew the equipment intimately (it was not for naught that he completed the school at the top of the class), every mechanism has its own particular features all the same. He had to do a considerable amount of work to learn it, to assimilate all the equipment in the compartment masterfully.

Many skilled, conscientious hands are required in the engine compartment in order to do everything conscientiously. They are present on the team but Kuz'min sees what the people are made of, teaches them on the job, and acclimates them to working under stress. Add to that personal example, of course. The work technique acquired early on in the PTU [professional-technical school] and the repair brigade assisted the warrant officer. The machinist's mate could illustrate how the work was to be done. Kuz'min was referred to then as "industrious, diligent." But, one team member added: "he loves the equipment more than he does people." Those words were untrue, only half true. Yes, it did occur once that the sailors from other subunits [podrazdeleniya] were preparing to watch a movie and the machinists, headed by the machinist's mate, continued to work in their own compartment.

But, what do such events say? More about the warrant officer's high sense of responsibility -- that quality that he always inculcated in his subordinates, that he demanded, so that they would approach the equipment with respect and professional consideration, keep it clean and in full readiness to sail. Warrant Officer Nikolay Kuz'min learned this in his youth from his father, a kolkhoz tractor driver. Not once did the tractor fail the leading machine operator, just as during the war years he was never let down by the cannon that he travelled with from the Kursk Salient to Prague. The front line soldier's son has been entrusted with different combat equipment but he has retained and nurtured that valuable soldier's quality -- the ability to care for his true friend, his weapon.

A working atmosphere rules in the engine compartment. Wrenches clattered, from time to time exhortations rang out: "Let's go!", "Hold on!", "One more time!" The submariners understood each other implicitly. They liked

their work. They lost track of time. Then, suddenly, like a shot, a metal deck plate clanged. Somewhere, a heavy monkey wrench banged against it. "You bungler!" Kuz'min wanted to scream but he suddenly felt that he was beginning to lose his equilibrium. "No way, the boat lurched."

"Attention in the compartment!" the intercom brought in the voice of the officer of the watch. "The captain wants to know how much time you require to finish your work?.."

The boat rocked violently. Apparently, an ocean swell had rolled into the roads. The weather had deteriorated rapidly. Now the work would be more difficult but only a tiny bit was left to do... Gazing into the compartment, the warrant officer quickly figured: about 20 minutes of work. But, to cover anything unexpected that might come up, he reported that he could get underway in 30 minutes. "Time to assist Shakhmayev," he decided and hurried topside.

The ocean's waves rolled over the ship, licked the sides, hissed and foamed in the outer hull's cut-outs. Their hissings became ominous. "Hook up, Denoy!" the warrant officer commanded as he passed the safety lines to the sailor and crawled into the enclosure. Shakhmayev had everything ready to hermetically seal the neck of the gas valve. They worked in silence, concentrating, carefully considering each movement. Waiting for each wave in sequence to pass by, they went back to work, lining up and measuring the rubber packing. Finally, feeling each centimeter of packing and convinced of the reliability of all joints, Kuz'min said: "Finished. We can now start the diesels." The boat went off to battle the ocean once again. The weather had let the sailors down and, of course, had slightly altered the course of the holiday. But the mood was not ruined. Kuz'min was satisfied that the sailors had succeeded in doing the preventive maintenance, that the captain would thank them.

The diesel heart of the vessel beat evenly and powerfully. Kuz'min was always able to think freely and easily in this habitual situation. No, it was not for naught that he had devoted so much attention to the special and repair training of the machinists, that he had not shirked when demonstrating how to best and most easily perform each operation, which is in essence simple when you possess the requisite skill. In no way in conflict with methodology, he developed in his subordinates actions to a level of training approximating automation. Sure of his actions, a sailor strives more persistently for knowledge, competes with the very best specialists. Kuz'min supports this beginning in every possible way.

All machinists were included in the competition for the ship's best specialist at the first stage of the cruise. Then, only Leading Seaman Seken Zhenuspekov, initially actively engaged with all the others, for some reason began to frown more and more often. "Is it possible that I will be able to express myself in the competition as beautifully as Yezhov and Zakharov?" he stated his doubts in a chat with Kuz'min. "Our competition is not for the beauty of the words, but the beauty of the business at hand and

knowledge. The jury will not judge the force of your voice, understood?" the warrant officer convinced the sailor. The entire team then prepped Zhenuspekov for the competition. Seken did not let his comrades down. He took first place, and it follows that the entire team received a rating of "5+."

The boat went farther out to sea. Ahead of them stretched thousands of miles of space and many, many hours which would then translate into months of sailing and, in the final analysis, fall under the rubric of "cruise." Kuz'min, like all submariners, was accustomed to measuring the key stretches of his service by cruises. After one such cruise he became a combat qualified master, on one cruise the team joined the ranks of those rated excellent and, on this cruise, he was accepted as a candidate member of the CPSU.

The important events in his personal life are also linked with long cruises. After one cruise, he took his young wife to a northern garrison. And, after another in the string of cruises, Galina met him with Serezhka in her arms. After a new cruise, Serezhka, whose mother announced to him: "Here he is, your father," with halting steps ran to meet his father. Kuz'min gathered his young son up in his arms and the two of them hugged the happy waiting wife... Hardly had enough time passed for him to get acquainted with Serezhka and learn to love him, when the time again came for another cruise...

It is impossible to get accustomed to separation, but one has to be able to understand it. That is what the soldiers at the front did. That is how the veteran sailors take pride in the months and years spent on watch at sea. In the name of peace and tranquility on earth, in the name of the good fortune of the Motherland bathed in the light of Great October...

A signal light flashed in the compartment and the piercing trill of a bell broke through the roar of the engines. The vessel prepared to change the type of movement and Kuz'min moved to monitor the actions of the watch on duty. The cruise continued, everyday life at sea moved along, training to the last drop of sweat went on. Later on, after the cruise, the evaluation of the submariners will be high and all machinists will receive awards. The labor of Warrant Officer Kuz'min will be noted by the Pennant of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

Now, Warrant Officer Communist Kuz'min quietly and painstakingly is fulfilling his commander's responsibilities. With him are the sea and his beloved service. And, like himself, his people have been taught to do their duty in a model fashion. With each of them, let him "get corns for the next 3 years" so that, in each one of them, he will discover an intelligent specialist and assistant, so that he will indoctrinate a reliable submariner.

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REGULATORY REQUIREMENT FOR COMMAND EXACTINGNESS DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 77 signed to press 20 Apr 77 p 37

[Article by Maj Gen Tank Trps A. Zyryanov: "Regulations and a Commander's Exactingness"]

[Text] Along with ideological-moral indoctrination, exactingness is the foundation for formation of high moral-combat qualities in Soviet soldiers. Exactingness is also an important stage in strengthening military discipline. It is no accident that the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces point up the requirement for daily exactingness of commanders (chiefs) towards their subordinates.

The major goal of exactingness is maintenance of the high combat readiness of the subunit [podrazdeleniye]. Every commander is obligated to be exacting, as is clearly reflected in our combined-arms regulations. Thus, the Internal Service Regulations stipulate that a commander (chief), within his authorized purview, must act independently and must require from subordinates adherence to Soviet law, as well as accurate and timely compliance with military regulations, their service obligations, and orders (instructions).

Experience shows that those commanders who act in this manner always achieve their goals. Their subunits possess high military discipline and maintain their weapons and combat equipment in an excellent manner. This state of affairs is accompanied by successes in combat and political training.

It is an accepted fact that exactingness is linked with all facets of service, with training and indoctrination of subordinates. Varied forms of exactingness are employed, depending upon the extant pedagogical situation and the interests of the service. The order (instruction) is an example. Giving an order, a commander expresses not only personal will but the will of the people. This will serve to give the orders a decisive nature and obliges the commander to achieve their unconditional execution. The unconditionality of execution of instructions is achieved by issuance of the instructions strictly according to procedure laid down by regulations.

Exactingness will lead to best results only when combined with precise monitoring of execution. Absence of control can breed gentleness and lack of discipline. Even a good soldier, if not monitored, can slacken his efforts and make mistakes. There are cases where a soldier, sergeant, or warrant officer [praporshchik] serves in a model fashion until such time as he gains authority. But, then he becomes satisfied with that which he has achieved. He is not performing at his best, but the senior chief does not monitor his actions, considering him, as usual, to be a leading soldier. In actuality, the soldier is resting on his laurels. But, this cannot happen when active controls are employed. Controlling, skillfully laying down requirements, a commander actively facilitates the growth of the subordinate and his careful execution of assigned service obligations.

High standards presuppose intolerance towards errors, irreconcilability towards deficiencies. It is a pleasure to note that the overwhelming majority of warrant officers and sergeants have made it a rule not to overlook even the slightest violation of procedures laid down by regulations, immediately and correctly taking the applicable measures.

Discovering deficiencies, it is important to be able to analyze the reasons behind them. Analysis is a very responsible task.

The main thing is to have the subordinate not only clearly see the essence of the errors, but also realize when and where he committed them. It is important for him to feel capable of correcting them. Thus, exactingness is not only impelling subordinates to conscientious execution of their obligations but also trusting them, trusting their strength and capability to independently solve the assigned problems.

"I was once called to the company commander's office," Sergeant I. Sapozhnikov related. "The deputy for political affairs, platoon commander, and first sergeant were also there. I knew that things were bad. They recounted the facts, one after the other. This compelled me to think seriously about my blunders. Then, at the conclusion of the discussion, the company commander said: 'We have laid it on the line with you, knowing that you are a resolute, strong commander. Therefore, we hope that you will succeed in correcting the situation in the shortest possible time. Many sergeants envy you for your knowledge and energy.'" He then specifically explained how to go about correcting the deficiencies. The sergeant left the office convinced of his abilities and with a desire to do better.

Our regulations derive from the fact that a commander, exhibiting exactingness towards subordinates, should expect exactly the same high standards from himself.

In this connection, it is very important for every warrant officer, every sergeant to see the shortcomings in his own work. They must learn to independently analyze their activities, self-critically approach errors, courageously admit to them, and attentively listen to suggestions and advice.

The personal example of the commander in compliance with regulations, orders, and instructions is a requirement. The soldiers always pattern themselves after the commander, the warrant officer, the sergeant. Exactingness, fortified by personal example, convincing, operative, morally justified, is accepted by subordinates as being proper.

Comprehensive instruction of personnel is one of a commander's important requirements. Thus, the Internal Service Regulations oblige a platoon commander to know the professional, political, and moral qualities of the personnel in the platoon, as well as each serviceman's name, year of birth, occupation prior to military service, family situation, and his successes and failures in combat and political training.

The commander's use of discipline is of exceptionally important significance in his individual work with subordinates. It is known that he has the right to approve those who merit approval and to punish the slackers. The Disciplinary Regulations clearly stipulate the procedure for making awards and meting out punishment. For example, these regulations underscore that any disciplinary punishment must correspond to the severity of the infraction and the degree of guilt. Further: "...when meting out disciplinary punishment, a commander (chief) must not be precipitate in determining the type and degree of punishment, denigrate the personal worth of the subordinate, or be punitive."

Working individually with subordinates, warrant officers and sergeants must not permit tutelage since it impedes the development of initiative and bravery and gives rise to passivity and lack of the individual's trust in his own abilities.

Authentic exactingness of a commander is useless without a constant concern about subordinates. The organic combination of exactingness towards subordinates with concern for them is the immutable law of the military construction of the USSR Armed Forces.

Exactingness has nothing in common with bluntness or coarseness. Such actions not only harm the individual but also are the mark of low culture on the part of a warrant officer or sergeant. They are a manifestation of their lack of discipline, self control, restraint, pedagogical tact, and the inability to use their authority to influence a subordinate. Actually, why raise your voice if you can quietly, tactfully, and with all strictness talk with a subordinate? Strictness is not measured in voice power. Unfortunately, one still encounters warrant officers and sergeants who cannot discern the line where high standards end and coarseness and invective begin.

At times, some justify bluntness in relations with subordinates by the complexity of the situation, a fiery nature, special circumstances, etc. Regulations give no discounts for such reasons. A commander, regardless of his rank, must be able to control his actions and relate respectfully to subordinates in any and all situations and conditions. As the Internal

Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces stipulate, a commander (chief) is obliged to combine high exactingness and principles with trust and respect for people, with a continual concern for them.

What do we mean by concern for a soldier?

This means to temper him ideologically, to cultivate him into a true and staunch defender of the Motherland, to teach him to defeat a strong, clever, well-armed enemy. From this -- a solicitous and exacting commander is one who trains troops in conditions characteristic of modern combat, trains them without shortcuts and simplifications, and achieves from the trainees a full straining of moral and physical forces, at the same time being concerned with improving that combat mastery so necessary for success in modern combat.

At tactical exercises held recently, the motorized rifle troops in the platoon where Senior Sergeant S. Igolkin is serving in an officer's position demonstrated high combat mastery and the ability to operate skillfully and with initiative in a complex and rapidly changing situation. For several days and nights, they solved difficult combat training problems with a feeling of great responsibility.

What presupposed the success of this subunit? Primarily, the high ideological and physical tempering, excellent mastery of weapons and combat equipment, the ability of sergeants to solve complex combat problems, i. e., that which is an example of a commander's primary concern. Concern must be constant, independent of where the subordinate is located: in the caserne, executing a mission detached from his subunit, or at tactical exercises.

A commander's exactingness is not a native skill. Senior commanders and party and Komsomol organizations are obliged to concern themselves with indoctrinating warrant officers and sergeants in this skill.

They are the very ones who must assist warrant officers and sergeants in finding the best ways to manifest real commander's exactingness. They must teach them to collate, according to regulations, their every step, action, and, in the final analysis, the life, customs and mores, and training of the subunit entrusted to them.

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CSO: 1801

COMPLAINTS FROM READERS: ACTIONS TAKEN

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 77 signed to press 20 Apr 77 p 38

[Article: "Although the Letter Was Not Printed"]

[Text] Warrant Officer [praporshchik] V. Rogov was transferred due to an operational requirement to another unit [chast'], but was not issued a rations certificate. When it was received after a long ordeal, it incorrectly reflected issuance of monetary compensation in place of rations. The warrant officer submitted a report requesting that the money due him be sent to his new place of duty and, during regular leave, he personally appealed about this matter to the responsible persons in the rear services section of the unit where he previously served. He did not receive a positive reply and wrote to the editorial board about the matter.

We forwarded this letter for investigation and resolution to the food supply section of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, from whence we received a quick response informing us that the commander of the unit where Warrant Officer Rogov had previously served ordered that Rogov be paid the 2 months of monetary compensation he had coming and that the money be sent to the complainant. The editorial board also received an analogous report from the commander of the unit where Rogov had previously served.

Warrant Officer A. Fominykh wrote the editorial board that, during his tour of duty at a motor pool, equipment was discovered to be missing and he was being held financially responsible, although he did not consider himself so. At our request, this complaint was investigated by the Commander of Aviation, Red Banner Pacific Fleet. He reported that the equipment loss resulted from poorly organized routine garrison duty, the order to fine Warrant Officer Fominykh had been rescinded, and the money returned to him.

Warrant Officer P. Klimko reported in his letter to the editorial board that the personnel of the unit in which he is serving aren't regularly receiving the newspapers and magazines to which they subscribed in 1977. The unit commander, to whom the editorial board went for clarification, reported that the delay in receipt of newspapers and magazines by unit

personnel was caused by Senior Lieutenant V. Korobov, who has been disciplined. Unit personnel presently are receiving their correspondence regularly.

Warrant Officer V. Devyatykh complained to the editorial board that he had not been paid a monetary award for class qualification. His unit commander informs us that an administrative investigation was conducted and resulted in a decision to pay Warrant Officer Devyatykh the established monetary award in full for the period he has been eligible for such payment.

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QUESTIONS ON WARRANT OFFICER SERVICE ANSWERED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 77 signed to press 20 Apr 77 p 38

[Article by Col V. Ye. Storozhenko, Deputy Chief, Warrant Officer Cadres Section: "In the Interests of Service"]

[Text] This year, many warrant officers [praporshchiki i mlichmany] complete their first 5-year term of military service. Correct organization of efforts to extend their service in units [chasti] and aboard ships is of important significance. During this period, commanders, political and cadre workers, chiefs of services, and secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations are holding timely discussions with each warrant officer, are providing a comprehensive evaluation of their service activities and moral qualities, and specifically pointing out those areas of work and conduct requiring attention. A correct approach is being taken in those units and aboard those ships where the needs of the warrant officers expressed during these meetings are brought to light and where these needs are being addressed in a timely manner.

In turn, the warrant officers whose tours of duty are coming to an end must themselves critically evaluate the results of their work, eliminate extant deficiencies, and fully justify, through their own faultless service, the trust shown them.

The editorial board of ZNAMENOSETS requested that the Chief Directorate of Cadres, USSR Ministry of Defense answer a number of questions concerning service as a warrant officer. Colonel V. Ye. Storozhenko, Deputy Chief, Warrant/Officer Cadres Section, provides explanations in response to these questions.

[Question] What changes have been introduced into warrant officer service?

[Answer] The decision has been made to accept individuals for service as warrant officer not only for a period of 5 years, as was initially established,

but for a longer period in order to further stimulate the extended continuous service of this category of military cadres. Before, extension of the term of service of a warrant officer was only 3 or 5 years, but now it is for a longer term. This creates for the warrant officer more certitude in their service as a profession and facilitates strengthening of cadres of worthy servicemen.

The decision has also been made to accept into service as warrant officers first term servicemen possessing a higher or a secondary special civilian education, similar in training profile to a military specialty, after the first year of service. After being sworn in as a warrant officer, they and their families are provided all the rights, benefits, and privileges accorded to warrant officers and their families. This is an important benefit for servicemen wishing to become warrant officers. It is very important that these statutes are brought to the attention of servicemen in military units and aboard ships and that efforts are constantly made to attract worthy servicemen and persons liable to the draft for service as warrant officers.

[Question] How do warrant officers who have served their first 5-year term of military service extend their term of service?

[Answer] Extension of service as a warrant officer is voluntary, as stated above, for a period of at least 3 years. The obligation to extend service is authorized by the staff of the unit (chief) possessing the right to accept individuals into service as a warrant officer. The obligation is authorized 3 months prior to the expiration of the term of service stipulated by a previously signed obligation.

An order is published throughout the personnel section announcing the service extension and the corresponding notation is made in the personnel records of the warrant officer.

[Question] What is the age limit for service as a warrant officer?

[Answer] In accordance with the USSR Law on Universal Military Service, warrant officers may remain on active duty until they have reached age 45, after which they are discharged into the reserves. Where required, some who have reached this age can, with their consent, remain in service for up to 5 years. The right to permit warrant officers to remain in service is vested in the commanders of regiments, those equal to them, and higher commanders.

[Question] How do warrant officers who have reached the age limit and who have served their obligatory first 5-year term of service go about remaining in the service?

[Answer] In this instance, the warrant officer must submit a report through channels on his desire to continue on active duty. The report must also contain the period he wishes to remain on active duty. If approved by the commander (chief), an order is published throughout the personnel section announcing that the warrant officer is remaining on active duty for the

corresponding period and the report, containing the approval of the commander (chief), is filed in the warrant officer's personnel records.

[Question] How do warrant officers certify the completion of the 5-year term of service in accordance with a previously signed obligation?

[Answer] Certification is made in such a way that, by the time the 5-year term of service expires, certifications for the warrant officers will have been approved and a decision as to their further service made.

The certification provides a comprehensive character reference as to the political, professional, and moral-combat qualities of the warrant officers, level of training, determines the conformity of the person being certified to the position held, recommends further service, and points up extant deficiencies in the service and in the personal conduct which require elimination.

The process of warrant officer certification must facilitate indoctrinating them in a feeling of responsibility for their entrusted duties, further improvement in combat and political training, and strengthening military discipline.

[Question] In what instances can warrant officers, after expiration of term of service, be permitted to transfer to a unit other than the one in which they served when accepting that term of service?

[Answer] Transfer of warrant officers from one unit to another upon their application in connection with expiration of a term of service stipulated in the obligation is possible only for valid reasons.

The interests of the service require retention of a stability of warrant officer cadres in units and aboard ships and elimination of unnecessary transfers. Therefore, when warrant officers apply for a transfer to another unit, commanders and chiefs must comprehensively and attentively investigate all the circumstances surrounding the request for transfer. If the reasons for transfer are found to be valid, then the authorization for transfer of the warrant officer to another unit can be accomplished immediately, prior to expiration of the period covered by a previously signed obligation.

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IMPORTANCE OF PROPER ATTENTION TO SERVICEMEN'S LETTERS STRESSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 77 signed to press 5 May 77 pp 3-7.

[Article: "To Improve the Handling of Letters"]

[Text] There is no headquarters, political organ, establishment, training institution, newspaper or magazine editorial board in the USSR Armed Forces, which does not receive letters from military personnel or members of their families, workers and employees of the Soviet Army and other citizens.

Today's mail convincingly reflects the great patriotic enthusiasm and creative activeness of the Soviet Nation's armed defenders, the result of successes achieved by the Soviet people in their fulfillment of the grand plans outlined by the 25th Party Congress. The letters express total and unanimous approval of the political line and practical work of the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo headed by General Secretary of the CPSU, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, and reflects gratitude for the constant concern shown for improving the Soviet people's welfare and strengthening the nation's economic strength and defenses.

There has been an increase in the number of comments on the party's most important decisions and enactments in the area of domestic and foreign policy. Fighting men of the army and navy greeted the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee, "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," with fervent approval. Their thoughts and deeds are in keeping with the present general mood of all our people as they prepare a fitting reception for the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The letters from the fighting men report on the course of socialist competition, those achieving outstanding successes in training and the successes being achieved by the personnel in honor of the national holiday. There has been a considerable increase in the number of practical proposals, useful advice and recommendations, imbued with concern for further improving the quality of combat and political training, maintaining combat readiness and military discipline on a high level and improving the maintenance of combat equipment and weapons.

In their letters, for example, officers I. Panchuk, V. Kvashnin and others submitted proposals for improving the state of combat readiness of the equipment, improving the training of motor vehicle operators and resolving other problems. In his letter to a higher political organ Senior Lieutenant V. Morozov, while giving a positive appraisal to the state of affairs in the unit (chast), is concerned with the fact that there are deficiencies in the training of future sergeants in the training subunit (podrazdeleniye) in which he serves. The officer expressed his thoughts on improving the quality of their training. Whenever necessary appropriate orders are issued and other steps taken to realize the proposals contained in these letters.

V.I. Lenin regarded letters from the workers as a source of information and a medium for reflecting the public opinion and developing criticism and self-criticism. He stressed the need to take timely and proper action on each of them. The enormous number of letters which Vladimir Il'ich received from various cities and villages in our nation helped him to acquire reliable knowledge on the moods of the masses, the needs and demands of the people. In V.I. Lenin's opinion letters from the workers constitute control from below, and he therefore demanded that the work be organized in such a way that the work of all institutions was imbued with concern for satisfying the Soviet people's needs, attention and rapid response to their messages. Our party's leader lashed out at manifestations of red tape and bureaucracy in the handling of letters.

Our party carefully preserves and develops Lenin's approach to the consideration of letters and oral appeals from the workers. This has been confirmed in many party documents. The 25th CPSU Congress again directed attention to the importance of this area of work. Addressing the congress with the Accountability Report from our party's Central Committee Comrade L.I. Brezhnev pointed out that the party regards letters from the workers as one of the forms of its contact with the masses, reflecting the tremendous enthusiasm of millions of workers, the pulsebeat of a great and powerful nation building communism.

The decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee on 28 April 1976, "On Further Improvement of the Handling of Letters From the Workers in Light of Decisions of the CPSU Congress," summarizes the enormous body of experience accumulated by party and soviet organs in considering letters, complaints and claims. It stresses the fact that in the situation of systematic development of socialist democracy further improvement of the handling of letters and all around improvement of its forms and methods are acquiring ever increasing importance. The Central Committee demands that party, soviet and administrative agencies strictly penalize officials violating the established procedure for considering letters from the workers and guilty of a formal and bureaucratic approach to this important job, that they respond in a timely manner to critical alarm signals and reports on deficiencies and abuses, that they make more frequent visits to localities in order to check out specific complaints.

A great deal has been done in the Soviet Army and Navy to fulfill the party's requirements and the order issued by the USSR Minister of Defense on further improving the handling of letters. The consideration of letters and the reception of visitors have been improved in the military units (chasti and soye-dineniya), in establishments and training institutions. The handling of

letters has become more systematic and is being more thoroughly reviewed at meetings of military councils of the branches of Armed Forces, groups of forces, military districts and fleets, and in political organs.

The military council of the Ground Forces heard a report on this matter from a member of the military council, the chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District. Progress in the fulfillment of requirements of the CPSU Central Committee and the order from the USSR Minister of Defense on further improving the handling of letters was reviewed in the political directorate of the Navy. The recommendations presented there are having a favorable effect on the organizational work of commanders, political organs, staffs and party organizations connected with the consideration of letters and the fulfillment of decisions taken on them, and are helping to efficiently eliminate shortcomings.

Commanders and chiefs are strictly seeing to it that letters received by staffs, establishments and organizations under their command are carefully and thoroughly considered, that appropriate measures are taken on them and that their authors are informed of this in a timely manner.

Political organs of the army and navy have begun to direct the work of party organizations in a more concrete fashion towards further improving the handling of letters. The communists are focusing their main attention on seeing to it that a respectful and serious attitude is universally taken towards the proposals, claims, alarm signals and complaints of military personnel, workers and employees of the Soviet Army and other citizens. Naturally, the political organs themselves are expected to set the prime example of this. The work is being carried out in precisely this fashion in many political organs of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District. The recording of incoming correspondence is well organized there, established deadlines for reviewing it are strictly observed, properly substantiated replies are sent to the authors and once a quarter internal checks are made on the state of work involving letters.

The party approach to this important matter is also demonstrated in the unit in which Major N. Norets is party committee chairman. It has been repeatedly discussed at party committee meetings, a seminar for secretaries of subunit party organizations and an officers' conference. Commanders, political workers and active party members in the unit understand that giving attention to a letter, claim or complaint is the same as giving attention to an individual and they know how to proceed in either case. Issues raised in letters are thoroughly analyzed and valuable proposals are utilized for resolving problems of training and indoctrinating the personnel.

There has been an improvement in the way letters are handled in the editorial offices of military newspapers and magazines. Their publications contain more selections and surveys of letters, reports on steps taken, articles and advice columns, which clarify the requirements of the military oath, general service regulations and Soviet laws and the procedure for submitting complaints and claims by military personnel, their review and resolution.

All of this is having a positive effect on the morale of the personnel and is strengthening the moral and political state of servicemen and their families. This is why it is important to support positive experience and effectively eliminate deficiencies. This was pointed out by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, which discussed the fulfillment by army and navy political organs of the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee, "On Further Improving Handling of Letters From the Workers in Light of Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress." It was noted in particular that the importance of this work is still underestimated in some cases and that letters and the causes of various complaints are analyzed in a superficial manner. At many garrisons little is done to explain to military personnel Soviet laws, the procedure for serving in the military and benefits established for servicemen and their families. In some cases the questions raised are answered in a formal and incompetent manner, which results in a stream of repeat letters.

A lack of concern for proposals, requests and complaints at the site sometimes forces individuals to appeal to higher authorities. Here are some examples. Major A. Vasilenko repeatedly informed authorities in the oblast military commissariat and the district of deficiencies in the city military commissariat and improper conduct on the part of military commissar Comrade K. Kolesov. There was no response to his messages, however. He then wrote a letter to Moscow. A check confirmed his facts. Strict measures were taken against the offenders, along both party and service lines. Reserve Sergeant V. Vasyutin wrote a letter to the subunit in which he was serving, requesting a performance rating and a recommendation for enrollment in the preparatory department of an institute. The request of the former expert in combat and political training went unanswered. Only after repeated appeals to the unit commander and other agencies did he receive his recommendation.

Control over the handling of letters and implementation of decisions made on them has weakened in some places. This is in spite of the fact that the Instructions on the Procedure for Reviewing Proposals, Claims and Complaints and Receiving Visitors in Military Units and Establishments of the Soviet Army and Navy require that an internal check of the handling of letters and the reception of visitors be made at least once a quarter.

Complaints and claims are sometimes needlessly transferred to lower headquarters and establishments. Furthermore, they are sometimes delivered to those officials whose actions are the subject of the complaints.

Checks have shown that the reception of visitors is unsatisfactorily organized in many units. Certain commanders sometimes use various excuses to avoid personally receiving servicemen, workers and employees and members of their families, shifting this important duty of theirs to individuals without authority to resolve the issues. Unfortunately, some political organs and party organizations do not always appraise this practice from a principled and party standpoint and are not demanding enough of communists who show no concern for the needs of the fighting men.

It is essential that all necessary measures be taken to insure precise fulfillment of the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee, "On Further Improving the Handling of Letters From the Workers in Light of Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress," the ukase passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 12 April 1968, "On The Procedure for Considering Proposals, Claims and Complaints From Citizens," and the requirements set forth in the Internal Service Regulations, the Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces, and the order issued by the USSR Minister of Defense.

The handling of letters and the reception of visitors should be regarded as one of the most important areas of party and service work by commanders and chiefs. The order issued by the USSR Minister of Defense requires that these matters be discussed at least once a year at sessions of military councils and systematically at conferences and meetings conducted by commanders and political organs.

Great operational efficiency is required in the consideration of letters containing proposals aimed at improving the combat readiness of the troops and the training process and strengthening military discipline, letters which report cases of deviations from established disciplinary practices and other violations of military regulations and those which expose shortcomings in socialist competition and in party-political work.

The defense minister requires that greater use be made of the practice of receiving visitors by leading personnel of military districts, groups of forces, fleets, flotillas and the central staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense during visits to the forces. It is important not only to arrive at a decision on the subject of an appeal but also to eliminate the causes of violations of the rights and legal interests of servicemen, members of their families, workers and employees of the Soviet Army and other citizens.

The experience of those political organs which systematically discuss the handling of letters with the party active membership, submit conclusions drawn from the analysis of incoming letters for the commanders' decisions and develop intolerance for formalism is worthy of universal application.

Party organizations, especially those of headquarters, establishments and military commissariats, as well as production and trade enterprises, construction organizations and establishments should extensively utilize the tried and proven method of individual indoctrinational work with officers and employees directly involved in the review and handling of letters, increase their personal responsibility for the assigned job, strive to achieve a careful regard for proposals and complaints and react efficiently to cases of bureaucratism and red tape. In order to eliminate deficiencies in the handling of letters it is essential to make more active use of the force of public opinion, committees and peoples' control groups, regularly discuss these matters at party meetings, committee and bureau sessions, and thoroughly encourage the practice whereby staff officers and officers of political organs in their work in the forces always study the course of fulfillment of instructions issued by the CPSU Central Committee and the order issued by the USSR Ministry of Defense on the handling of letters and summarize and introduce positive experience.

Established time periods for considering letters are still sometimes violated. Remember that letters, claims and complaints in units and establishments, as stated in the order issued by the USSR Minister of Defense, are to be reviewed immediately, in all cases no later than 7 days following their receipt, and no later than 15 days following their receipt in the directorates of districts, groups of forces and fleets and the USSR Ministry of Defense. The established period may only be extended in exceptional cases, when a special check is required. It may not be extended by more than 15 days, however, and the author of the letter must be informed of this.

An analysis of the substance of complaints carried out in a number of units (chasti, soyedineniya) indicates that the authors frequently lack knowledge of current laws and instructions and of the rights and benefits established for various categories of servicemen and do not observe the procedure for submitting complaints. Because of this the dissemination of legal information is becoming very important. We should continue to devote unweakened attention to it, work directly in the subunits more frequently and acquaint the personnel with the fundamentals of Soviet law, legal standards and the requirements set forth in military regulations, manuals and instructions. We should make extensive use of leading personnel, military legal experts, members of agitation and propaganda collectives and groups of informants and should step up the work of schools and groups for legal information.

The military press is expected to provide a great deal of assistance to commanders and political organs with respect to improving the handling of letters. Army and fleet newspapers and magazines should systematically publish letters from readers, criticize manifestations of a formal attitude toward critical reports from military personnel and widely publicize incidents of red tape and indifference to letters. At the same time, specific steps should be taken to improve this work in the editorial offices.

Written and oral appeals from invalids of the Great Patriotic War and members of the families of dead servicemen and partisans require special attention. Such individuals enjoy universal honor and respect in our nation. In many villages and cities representatives of military commissariats, together with workers from the ispolkoms of local Soviets of Workers' Deputies, have made local visits and have found out just who is in need of what and have established strict order in the lists of those in line for improved housing. Unfortunately, letters to the editors also contain reports indicating that these people are not always treated in accordance with our moral standards and laws. And it is not just a matter of the invalid being able to enjoy the benefits due him in good time. It is a matter of moral atmosphere, a profound understanding of duty to individuals who became invalids while defending the homeland. Preparations for the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution should indicate continuing concern for them. This is a matter of honor for the military commissariats and for each labor collective.

The handling of letters from servicemen, workers and employees of the Soviet Army greatly reflects the state of organizational and mass political work carried out by commanders, political organs and party organizations and their vital

contacts with the personnel. The development in the individual of a noble feeling of responsibility for the homeland's security is achieved in every section of the work by constantly relying on the collective experience of the fighting men and paying attention to their advice, proposals and alarm signals. It should always be borne in mind that behind every letter is a living person. "After all, these are genuine human documents!" V.I. Lenin had to say about letters. And the better the system for considering them and the reception of visitors at all levels of the army and navy the more effective is the ideological and indoctrinational work carried out by commanders and political organs with the personnel and the more successful is the accomplishment of combat and political training tasks and the task of improving the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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RYBKIN ON VALIDITY OF LENIN'S VIEWS ON WAR AND REVOLUTION

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[Article by Col Ye. Rybkin, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor: "The Truth About War, Weapon of the Forces of Peace: On the 60th Anniversary of V.I. Lenin's Work, "War and Revolution"]

[Text] The lecture "War and the Revolution," which Vladimir Il'ich delivered to representatives of the party organizations of various rayons in Petrograd on 14 (27) May 1917, occupies a prominent place in that enormously rich treasure-house of works by V.I. Lenin on military-philosophical and military-political questions.¹

The lecture is remarkable for the fact that V.I. Lenin prepared and read it at one of the crucial moments in the development of the revolutionary process. We know that a mood of so-called "revolutionary defencism" spread over Russia following the February revolution. The nature of war had allegedly changed as a result of the Czarism's overthrow. It was now supposedly a matter of defending the revolutionary homeland and not one of seizing foreign territory.

A considerable portion of the workers, those who had still not lost faith in bourgeois and petty bourgeois politicians, did not understand that "revolutionary defencism" was the equivalent of the bourgeois slogan of fighting "to a victorious end." The masses were not aware of the fact that they had become a victim of fraud by the capitalists and the comprisors, the mensheviks and members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. It was essential to explain to the workers the true causes and goals of the war and the fact that the nature of war depends on the interests of those classes which are in power in the warring nations.

1. The text of the lecture entitled "War and Revolution" was long considered to have been lost. It was not until many years later that a written copy of the lecture was found and turned over to M.I. Ul'yanova at the Lenin Institute. It was published in the newspaper PRAVDA on 23 April 1929.

In his work "War and Revolution," V.I. Lenin revealed the sources for the occurrence and the essence of wars, demonstrated the attitude of various classes to wars, conducted a Marxist analysis of World War I and exposed the usurpacious policy of the imperialist nations -- the U.S.A., England, France and Germany, as well as that of the bourgeois Provisional Government of Russia. The leader of the proletariat provided an exhaustive answer to the question of how to put an end to imperialist warfare, showing that since it is caused by the dominant exploitative classes it can only be ended by a revolution of the proletariat. V.I. Lenin stressed the fact that only a socialist society and the fundamentally new international relations connected with it would inevitably eliminate the causes of war.

The broad campaign to publicize Marxist-Leninist teachings on war launched by the Bolsheviks played an enormous role in preparing the masses to accomplish the Great October Socialist Revolution.

V.I. Lenin's lecture "War and Revolution" is an organic extinction of the truly scientific teachings on war, the basic principles of which were worked out by K. Marx and F. Engels and underwent extensive development in a large number of works by Lenin ("The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution," "The Collapse of the Second International," "Socialism and War," and so forth). These teachings embrace a large range of problems: the essence of wars, their causes, the attitude of the fighting men towards the revolution and the interests of progress by mankind. The lecture as it were summed up the achievements of Marxism-Leninism in the area of teachings on war. At the same time, it does not focus on the past alone, on the accomplishment of tasks of that period, but also contains programmatic Marxist-Leninist positions on matters of war and peace which are still of paramount importance today. The forces of socialism and peace, communist and workers' parties and the CPSU continue to rely on the theoretical treasure created by V.I. Lenin and on the experience of the Leninist bolsheviks.

"Today, in the new phase of our nation's development," it says in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee, "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," "when tasks of unprecedented scope in the development of communism and the extremely important task of insuring lasting peace on earth are being resolved, the consistency and inviolable succession of our party's Leninist course are manifesting themselves with new force. With other weapons and in a different historical situation, having incomparably greater possibilities at its disposal, our party continues the great historical job for which the Leninist guard of the October Revolution fought....".

In his work "War and Revolution," V.I. Lenin thoroughly demonstrated once again how skillfully imperialism's ideologies stupefy the masses, instilling in them ideas of "defending the homeland," sowing every possible illusion as to the justice of an imperialist war and doing everything possible to mask the fact that the war is conducted in the interest of capital. Lenin's experience in exposing the imperialists' deception of the masses in matters of war and peace is exceptionally important at the present time, when bourgeois propaganda is attempting to turn back the process of detente and return international relations to the state of "cold war."

The forces of reaction, militarism and revanchism are attempting to fan the flames of the arms race and create conflicts. They deny the possibility and expediency of further detente and reviving the old devices of imperialist policy, casting doubt upon the sovereignty of nations and the inviolability of the existing boundaries. They advocate interference in the internal affairs of other nations, telling the people what internal systems should exist in this or that nation and what parties may or may not participate in government work. Under pressure from all sorts of militaristic forces attempts are made to distort the spirit and letter of the Helsinki Pact and distort the principles and agreements achieved there. Special attention is devoted to the spreading of all sorts of falsifying theories aimed at destroying in the broad masses their proper understanding of the essence, nature, sources and perpetrators of wars and designed to create an erroneous opinion about the essence of just and unjust wars and their role in history. "In order to achieve this," said Comrade L.I. Brezhnev at the Berlin Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties, "imperialism's aggressive forces and their toadies are reactivating the hackneyed myth of the notorious 'Soviet threat,' which allegedly hung over the nations of the West. Both the mass media and frequently officials in prominent positions persistently spread absurd statements which grossly distort the policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states."

Against common sense the socialist nations are held "responsible" for internal political events in other states, for civil and national liberation wars. The inhabitants are intimidated with pictures of "hordes of Russian tanks" and the idea is instilled in them that the USSR and other Warsaw Pact nations are building up their arsenal of weapons on an enormous scale, preparing for a "war against Western Europe."

The main thread running through the militaristic propaganda is the attempt to prove that "detente has lulled NATO" and that the USSR and its allies are planning a "massive offensive against the West and could be on the Rhine within 48 hours." Numerous newspapers and magazines, primarily in the U.S.A. and the FRG, daily proclaim that the Soviet Union in a frenzy of expansion "has focused on an invasion of the NATO nations in order to draw them into its orbit."

In order to conceal the true causes of wars the ideological arms bearers are attempting to establish something like a theoretical base by raising a fuss about "protection against the Soviet threat." In the first place all sorts of false theories about the sources of war and its basis, policy, are employed for this purpose. In the second place, attempts are made to whitewash capitalism, to present it as the bulwark of freedom and democracy, as a social system with no desire for war whatsoever. Thirdly, the essence of the Marxist-Leninist concept of war and the peace-loving trend of the socialist nations' policy are unscrupulously distorted. The first two areas of falsification were extensively developed at the beginning of the imperialist era, especially in connection with World War I. The falsifiers began focusing on the third area following the Great October Socialist Revolution.

A considerable portion of the bourgeois military theoreticians, of course, still consider correct the thesis formulated by Clausewitz to the effect that war is essentially a continuation of policy. Despite the historical narrowness of his teachings and their idealistic substance, V.I. Lenin points out in his lecture, "War and Revolution," that this theory was for its time a great step forward, helping to overcome ignorant views of warfare as a breakdown in political relations. It indicated further paths of investigation of the nature of war, hidden in the nature of the policy giving rise to it.

The legacy of Clausewitz was used in different ways, however. Marxism-Leninism adopted its rational gist, giving Clausewitz' definition totally new, class, genuinely scientific substance. As the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie increased it employed the Clausewitz theory in its own way. Today it either completely denies the political nature of warfare or falsifies the principles and essence of policy in every possible way as a social phenomenon in which the causes of wars and their goals are rooted.

While Marxism, as V.I. Lenin stressed, regards policy as a means of struggle by the classes and as a concentrated expression of the economy and, consequently, war is most deeply rooted in the social and economic relations of the exploiting society, bourgeois ideologists argue something entirely different. Policy in itself is presented by them as the subjective and rational activities of the leaders of this or that party or government. This is true, for example, of H. Morgenthau, founder of the concept of "political realism." He maintains that policy is an area of sober calculation, neutral with respect to economics, morals and so forth. The decision to wage war is made when a situation develops which violates the normal "balance of power" and the need arises to restore it in favor of a given state.

With respect to what leads to the destruction of this "balance of power" and wherein lie the deepest roots of a war the bourgeois ideology gives extremely diverse and contradictory answers to these questions. At the basis of political decisions leading to wars they detect the will of God, intrigues of the devil, "cosmic forces," the aggressive nature of man, demographic, technical, industrial or cultural conditions, the geographical situation, a clash of power "energetic" tensions and numerous other absolutely false factors.

Criticizing the views of reactionary philosophers, who distorted the true picture of the moving forces behind social processes, V.I. Lenin wrote in his work, "Materialism and Emperiocriticism": "There is nothing easier than attaching an "energy" or "biological-sociological" label to phenomena such as crises, revolutions, class struggles and so forth, but there is also nothing less fruitful or scholastic or more moribund than this activity" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 18, p 348).

Theories which find the causes of wars in scientific and technical progress are now assuming great currency in the West. Spokesmen for so-called "technological determinism," including R. Aron, M. McLuhan, E. Maren, L. Mumford, and others, separating themselves completely from the class essence of policy, regard the growth of industry, technology and science as a source of violence, which are not

only fatalistically and inevitably giving rise to military conflicts but also depersonalizing the forces organizing such conflicts. It would thus be impossible to name those guilty of starting wars. A skirmish involving nuclear missiles, point out American sociologists N. Zinberg and R. Feldman, "will signify the absence of any sort of identification of decisions and actions with specific personalities responsible for their adoption and implementation."

Representatives of these concepts and views on the causes of war, like many others less typical of contemporary times, are not all apologists for aggressive wars by far, and many of them promote peace. Objectively and from the standpoint of science their views on this matter nonetheless prevent seeing the true causes of wars in the modern era and exposing their perpetrators.

"...In policy," V.I. Lenin noted, "it is not so important just who are the direct defenders of certain views. What is important is who benefits from these views, these proposals, these measures" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 23, p 61). In his lecture, "War and Revolution," he states that the most important thing when the matter of war is discussed is "oblivion to the main question of the class nature of a war, why the war broke out, what classes are conducting it and what historical and historical-economic conditions brought it about....," which results in many hopeless controversies with respect to clarifying the truth about disputes. Many misunderstandings occur in this area precisely because we most frequently speak entirely different languages when we analyze the matter of war" (V.I. Lenin has in mind polemics between bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideologists and party workers. -- Ye. R.) ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 32, p 77).

The source of wars lies in the private ownership of the means of production, which gives rise to the corresponding political relations. War is in fact one of the forms of conducting policy, the most extreme and cruelest means. Criticizing ignorant opinions on the nature of war and its causes, extensively sewn by the bourgeoisie among the masses of workers, V.I. Lenin recalled the definition of war developed by the Marxists: "War is a continuation of policy by other means. Any war is inseparably linked with that political system from which it emerges. The same policy which a certain power or a certain class within that power has conducted for a long time prior to the war, is invariably and inevitably continued by that very class during the war, changing only the form of action." (Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 32, p 79).

Only by thoroughly analyzing the policy which has given rise to a war and by revealing its economic roots and class nature is it possible to appraise a war accurately and objectively. There are wars, and there are wars. V.I. Lenin states that it is necessary to ascertain the specific historical conditions from which a war arises. V.I. Lenin subjects to devastating criticism another device for justifying wars, rightly propagated today by imperialist ideologists. It would have us believe that wars are undertaken by bourgeois states for the sake of defending freedom and democracy.

During World War I such slogans were proclaimed by both of the warring sides. The leaders of parties in the Second International easily fell for these slogans, and they suited fairly broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie. Following the February revolution leaders of Russia's bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie parties depicted themselves as continuing the revolutionary and progressive wars of the bourgeoisie of the 17th through 19th centuries.

V.I. Lenin demonstrated the total inadmissibility of lumping together the wars of two totally different eras. The wars of the bourgeois French Revolution, for example, were a continuation of policy. V.I. Lenin states that the war was conducted in France in 1792 "by the revolutionary class, which accomplished an unprecedented revolution and with the unheard of heroism of the masses destroyed to its foundations the French monarchy and rose up against a united monarchistic Europe for no other purpose than that of continuing its revolutionary struggle" (Ibid, p 81). V.I. Lenin goes on to say that in World War I we were dealing primarily with an alliance between two groups of capitalist powers, the policy of which for many decades had consisted of continuous economic competition "to dominate the entire world, to oppress small ethnic groups and to obtain for itself threefold and tenfold profit from bank capital, which had drawn the entire world into the web of its influence" (Ibid).

In a number of works V.I. Lenin revealed the nature of imperialism as the highest and final level of development of capitalism. He demonstrated that imperialism signifies the beginning of the phase in which the bourgeoisie's full reactionary nature emerges along all lines, when by force of its nature it is no longer capable of conducting just wars of liberation. This was confirmed by the entire subsequent development of imperialism. World War II was born of antagonistic conflicts between two opposing groups of exploiting states. It was an event far more complex than the first, to be sure. In it conflicts between the strike forces of imperialism and socialism came to the fore for the first time. The Hitlerite bloc threatened the entire world, however. Because of this part of the imperialist powers, due to circumstances, entered an alliance with the USSR (in their own interest, however!) and engaged in a war of liberation. This turn of events, however, did not result from the nature of the imperialist bourgeois class, from its policy. In general, the U.S.A. and Great Britain were forced by external circumstances to assist the USSR in the war.

It is popular in the West today to turn not only to historical events of the distant past -- progressive wars conducted by the bourgeoisie of the 17th through 19th centuries -- but also to World War II for purposes of proclaiming the present imperialistic military blocs as continuers of the policy of struggling for freedom and democracy.

Lenin's theoretical legacy places in our hands a powerful weapon for struggling against such propagandist tricks, which are in a practical sense acts of ideological diversion. In the present period of the new era the imperialist powers, having thrown together aggressive blocs for combatting the revolutionary liberation movement of the peoples, controlling their working masses and undermining the world socialist system, are continuing to pursue the line of the most aggressive strike force of world reaction.

The contemporary monopolistic bourgeoisie is not engaged in any sort of defense of the democracy and freedom of nations. On the contrary, those forces which have represented its interests in policy have done nothing throughout the decades which have passed since World War II except oppress other nations and suppress mass movements in their own nations. Tormented during counter-revolutionary overthrows in various nations millions of people have fallen into "limited wars." It is the imperialists who are responsible for the outrageous wars in Indochina and Algeria, for the suppression of workers in the civil wars in Greece and the Dominican Republic, the bloody revolutions in Guatemala and Chile and many other such actions.

Enormous organizations, the military-industrial complexes, have developed under contemporary conditions in the leading imperialist nations. Their aggressive activities alarm even large sections of the bourgeoisie themselves. The military-industrial complexes are various industrial and financial corporations engaged in military production, which have joined up with certain elements of the government machinery. They constitute the main basis for the militarization of their nations and a source of military danger throughout the entire world. Like giant octopuses they entangle all spheres of public life in the imperialist states and suck their vital juices from them. Into their safes go incomes from military budgets inflated to unprecedented size. It is for their enrichment that wars, and if not wars, then in any case, maximum expansion of international tensions, are needed.

With false declarations of an imaginary Soviet threat our foes attempt to justify to the world community and the peoples of their own nations the unprecedented growth of their own aggressive military preparations, the stepped-up militarization of the capitalist states' economies and the subordination of their political, economic, scientific and spiritual life to the requirements of imperialism's insatiable military machine. It is planned to spend a record amount, 113 billion dollars, for military purposes in the U.S.A. in 1977. The planned figure for 1978 is more than 120 billion for those same purposes. Military outlays by the FRG just to equip the Bundeswehr with new types of weapons have increased 80 percent over the 1971 level. The military budgets of other NATO nations are steadily increasing.

Military orders bring the monopolies large and insured incomes. For example, net profits obtained by American military-industrial corporations for a single year were: General Electric -- 580.8 million; McDonnell-Douglas -- 85.6 million; Lockheed -- 45.3 million; Northrop -- 24.7 million; United Technology -- 117.5 million; Boeing -- 76.4 million; General Dynamics -- 84.5 million; and Rockwell International -- 101.6 million dollars.

The source of wars lies in the class interests of imperialism. From the socialist society's first appearance in the historical arena imperialism focused all its energy and mobilized the militaristic system created by it for the struggle against the society. The ideological weapons bearers of the military-industrial complexes also oppose communist ideology and socialism as a social structure because this ideology and this structure lead to the elimination of wars, to

the elimination of all coercion from the society of man. "...In our ideal," V.I. Lenin stated, "there is no place for the coercion of people" (Poln. sobr. soch., " Vol. 30, p 122). "...The achievement of a socialist social system ..., eliminating the division of humanity into classes and all exploitation of man by man and of one nation by others, will inevitably eliminate any possibility of wars in general" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 32, p 78).

In his work, "War and Revolution," V.I. Lenin further developed the tenet of Marxist teachings on the attitude towards wars of liberation. Thoroughly revealing the causes and the nature of imperialist wars, rooted in the economy and policy of the reactionary bourgeoisie, V.I. Lenin stressed that "we Marxists are not among those absolutely opposed to any war.. we can therefore not reject the possibility of revolutionary wars, that is, wars emerging from a class struggle, conducted by revolutionary classes and with a direct and immediate revolutionary significance" (Ibid).

In connection with this V.I. Lenin explained that the nature of the war had not changed since the bourgeoisie had come to power in Russia following the February revolution, that it remained reactionary because the Provisional Government remained loyal to the secret agreements on the division of the world, annexations and contributions for which the war was fought. It would be necessary to replace the class in power, to transfer power to the proletariat in order for the war to become a just and revolutionary one. It was only after the proletariat assumed power and carried out truly revolutionary reforms that the war against the imperialist states assumed a different nature. This would now be a new war, a war in defense of the socialist homeland, a war against attempts by international reaction to restore the power of capital in our nation and to eliminate the revolutionary achievements of the workers by armed means.

The Russian proletariat and peasantry had to conduct such a war immediately following the Great October Socialist Revolution. "The broadest masses of the working people and all progressive people of science and culture backed the revolution and the working class," it is pointed out in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee on the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. "The working class countered fierce armed, political and ideological resistance by the reactionary forces, disorganization of the economy and counter-revolutionary sabotage and the bloody bourgeois terror with the highest level of organization and aware discipline, solidarity with the Communist Party and revolutionary vigilance. The entire course of the struggle against internal counter-revolution and foreign interventionists showed that a revolution can only consolidate its victory if it is able to defend itself."

The Great Patriotic War was even more difficult. The Soviet people accomplished a feat in that war, the equal of which mankind had not known. They were not only able to defend their freedom and independence but also made a crucial contribution to the job of rescuing European and world civilization from destruction by the fascist barbarians.

Lenin's criticism of the imperialists' usurpacious wars against nations lagging in their development was especially acute. "Peace has reigned in Europe," said V.I. Lenin, "but it was only maintained because the domination of hundreds of millions of colonial people has been accomplished by the European nations only by means of constant, continuous and unceasing wars, which we Europeans do not consider wars because they have all too frequently resembled not wars but the most brutal massacre and destruction of unarmed peoples" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 32, p 80).

Following World War II a new zone of wars lay between the depressed peoples and the colonizers. Because of the altered historical situation, however, primarily the existence of the socialist system in the world, the outcome of those wars was different: imperialism suffered defeat. The world colonial system collapsed. This does not mean, however, that imperialism has rejected its policy of suppressing other nations. It is still continuously initiating military conflicts, organizing coup d' etats and acts of terrorism in the new nations and threatening them with military intervention and other acts of force. In other words, imperialism's policy with respect to the former colonies remains basically unchanged. It has only assumed new forms, among which armed force continues to occupy an important place.

In this situation the socialist comity represents that powerful and dependable force which is providing peoples struggling for freedom with all around support. "...The socialist nations," declared Comrade L.I. Brezhnev during a meeting with Comrade F. Castro on 5 April 1977, "are always on the side of nations confronting imperialist aggression, dictation and coercion."

V.I. Lenin devoted a great deal of attention to the matter of peace, which was one of the most acute during the period between February and October of 1917. "The war is caused by the dominant classes and it will only be ended by a revolution of the working class. Whether you achieve a rapid peace depends only on how the revolution develops," he pointed out ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 32, p 102).

All of subsequent history has shown that the development of the world revolutionary process not only hastened the end of World War I and not only insured victory over the forces of extreme reaction in World War II through the USSR, but was also that force which at the present time constitutes a powerful barrier to imperialism's aggressive policy.

V.I. Lenin's ideas on the need to expose the fabrications of bourgeois propaganda on the nature and causes of wars, the "defense" of freedom and democracy, are especially valid today given the current attacks of imperialist reaction against international detente and new attempts to turn the world back to the "cold war." With respect to our course, as Comrade L.I. Brezhnev noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, we have followed and continue to follow the instructions of the great Lenin, who demanded the largest possible number of decisions and steps which would lead to peace. "...We will continue this policy with twice the vigor," stressed Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, "attempting to curb the forces of war and aggression, to strengthen universal peace and insure the right of peoples to freedom,

independence and social progress" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 4).

The lessons of the world wars are of great importance in the present struggle for peace. V.I. Lenin's analysis of the political essence of World War I and of those revolutionary processes which it accelerated convince us that by unleashing a war imperialism is only exacerbating the conflicts inherent in it and undermining its own existence. The forces of peace are becoming even stronger in response to the horrors of war, to the new threats of military upheavals. In view of the fact that imperialism is not giving up its plans for armed coercion, however, the strengthening of our nation's defense capability and that of the entire socialist comity and building up the combat strength of the Soviet Armed Forces and all fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact members constitutes an essential factor for the forces of peace.

V.I. Lenin's work, "War and Revolution," has thus been of great importance to the work of the CPSU, communist and workers' parties of the fraternal nations in resolving the extremely important issues of war, peace and revolution, and continues to be.

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